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ABSTRACT 
The central tenet of the thesis is that violence is a problem 
- a problem that has resisted solution primarily because we 
have habitually misconceived what it is about violence that 
makes it a problem. The thesis consequently offers an 
understanding of violence and, on the basis of this 
understanding, proposes a practical ethic designed to work 
against violence, while augmenting our moral power and 
general welfare, in human society. 
Part One is a factual analysis of violence in terms of what 
is called Value Intonomy. The aim is to show that reference 
to individual Value Intonomy explains what it is that makes 
violence harmful and, therefore, a problem. Ancillary 
hypotheses, on the addictive nature of violence and the 
integral nature of the problem of violence in human society, 
are appended to this part to complete the theory of violence 
offered. 
Part Two is an ethical analysis of violence in terms of what 
is called the Right to Value Intonomy Theory. This theory is 
explained, in the context of rights theories, and it is 
argued that violating the right to Value Intonomy is what 
makes violence morally wrong. It is then argued that 
recognising this Right, as the fundamental right of all moral 
agents, is a necessary condition for any ethic that is 
intended as being effective against violence. 
Finally, Part Three offers a Broad Consequentialism, based on 
the Right to Value Intonomy and called Renovation Ethics, as 
a practical solution to the problem of reducing violence and 
augmenting welfare in human society. 
i 
INDEX 
PART ONE: The Value Intonomy Theory of Violence 
Chapter One A Theory of Violence 
Chapter Two The Integral Paradigm 
Chapter Three The Addiction Hypothesis 
Chapter Four The Economy of Violence 
PART TWO: The Right to Value Intonomy 
Chapter Five Rights Theory 
Chapter Six The Right to Value Intonomy 
Chapter Seven Value Intonomy as a Foundation 
PART THREE: Renovation Ethics 
Chapter Eight The Ethic Explained 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ii 
Pg 1 
Pg 14 
Pg 28 
Pg 38 
Pg 50 
Pg 62 
Pg 78 
Pg 91 
lg 107 
PART ONE: The Value Intonomy Theory of Violence 
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Chapter One 
A THEORY OF VIOLENCE 
'Violence' is a word used in more than one sense. It is, for 
example, obvious that someone using the word, say to describe 
the violent movements of a dancer, or a violent thunder 
storm, has in mind something very different to someone who 
speaks of, say, cultural violence or sexism as a violence 
against women. 
The first use of the word primarily denotes force, 
particularly gross or sudden force. In law, for example, we 
distinguish between straight-forward robbery, and robbery 
with violence, precisely by means of the quality of force 
employed in the latter. We also talk, metaphorically, of 
things like a violent clash of colours. In these instances 
the idea of intensity predominates. Indeed, the etymology of 
the english word 'violent' comes from the root 'vis', meaning 
'strength', via the latin noun 'violentia', meaning 
'impetuosity'. The second use of the word, however, involves 
violation. It denotes the misuse of power to breach, trespass 
or harm. The subtle institutionalised misuse of power in 
slavery, for example, can be called violent in this second 
sense even in those instances where it can not be called 
violent in the first sense. 
The English language does not distinguish between the various 
senses of the word 'violence' and its cognates. We do not 
have distinct terms for violence-as-force, violence-as-harm 
violence-as-trespass and violence-as-wrong, although these 
are conceptually distinct and we can intend any of them, 
alone or in combination, when we use the word. In ordinary 
usage the elements of violence often run parallel or even at 
cross-purposes. 
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This lack of linguistic subtlety is a source of chronic 
confusion in debates about violence. A person referring to 
something as violent in the forceful sense, for example, 
often intends that the force also be understood as harmful, 
wrong or both. I will not, however, be attempting in this 
thesis to explicate the many and subtle combinations or 
force, harm and wrong that can mark various uses of the word. 
Instead I will concentrate on the second use of the word (ie: 
the idea of violence as the violation of something) and the 
unqualified word 'violence' will be used in this sense. This 
sense often subsumes the senses of violence as forceful, 
harmful or wrong. Where these distinctions are important I 
will use the device off/violence (for violence as force), 
h/violence (for violence as harm) and m/violence (for 
violence as wrong). 
This thesis will attempt to show that the intuitions, 
motivating the violence-as-violation sense of the word, are 
conceptually accurate. Something real is violated by all 
those acts and institutions we recognise or intuit as 
violent. Moreover, it is the very same thing which is 
violated in every case; whether the force used is as gross 
and explosive as a military assault, or as subtle and 
institutionalised as a prevailing cultural attitude. It is 
the nature of that violation which is the first subject of 
this thesis. This is not necessarily to assert that acts 
which do not meet the criteria of violence as violation 
(criteria that will be given in this thesis) are not, 
therefore, violent. A central tenet of the thesis is, 
however, that when we speak of violence as a problem, it is 
the violating aspect of violence which makes it 
problematical. It should also be stressed, before explicating 
the theory proper, that the Value Intonomy Theory of Violence 
is not a theory about m/violence. It is, rather, a theory 
about what violence is and how it works. 
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THE FACT OF VALUE INTONOMY 
The Right to Value Intonomy Theory, and Renovation Ethics, 
both argued for in this thesis, are based on a theory of 
violence which postulates that what makes any act, attitude 
or social institution violent (whether or not it employs 
gross or sudden force) is the violation of something 
essential and important about what it is to be a person. For 
this aspect of personhood, violated by violence, I coin the 
phrase Value Intonomy (the word 'intonomy' is a synthesis 
of the words 'integrity' and autonomy' - moral integrity and 
moral autonomy being the two primary elements of personhood 
that are the victims of violence). 
By 'person' I primarily intend those beings who evaluate 
(literally e-value-ate) their life experiences. And by 'Value 
Intonomy' I intend the moral and psychological cohesion of 
personality as an aspect of such beings. I will argue that 
reference to violence as a violation of Value Intonomy 
already functions implicitly in our common and enduring 
intuitions about both what violence is and why it is a 
problem - the theory is intended to explain our intuitions 
rather than replace them. I will further argue that explicit 
reference to the effect of violence on Value Intonomy is 
crucial to any true understanding of the troublesome nature 
of violence. 
The phrase 'Value Intonomy', in the theory, primarily denotes 
the integration, into a morally autonomous and 
psychologically whole unit (a person), of those elements or 
properties that are necessary and sufficient for persons to 
think and act as if they were fully-functioning moral agents. 
It is also, however, that aspect of being a person which is 
the ultimate source of, and ground for, our belief systems 
about the value, meaning and significance of being persons. 
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It should be noted here that Value Intonomy does not require 
that human beings actually be moral agents in a metaphysical 
sense - only that they persons 1 • 
One of the things which human persons do is think and act as 
if they were moral agents. However, for human beings to 
actually be moral agents, in the metaphysical sense, requires 
that at least three things hold: 
1) That they do have genuine freedom of moral choice. 
2) That moral values (such as good and evil) actually exist. 
3) That they have some kind of access to knowledge of moral 
values when making their moral choices. 
These three conditions have all been powerfully challenged 
and, at the time of writing, remain among the most 
controversial issues in moral philosophy. Nevertheless, and 
regardless of the outcome of the debates about these issues, 
the fact remains that human beings do normally think and act 
as if they were moral agents. They attribute value and 
meaning to states of affairs. This is a distinctive, endemic 
and treasured element of what it is to be human. It is 
because of this syndrome of belief and behaviour that they 
perceive certain behaviours to be violent, and it is because 
of this belief that they perceive violence to be a problem. 
My own conviction is that the reason human beings think and 
act as if they were moral agents is precisely because they 
are moral agents. It is not, however, the intention of this 
thesis to specifically argue this case. It is enough for the 
theory to observe that humans do so think and act and, on the 
basis of this observation, define Value Intonomy in terms of 
that thought and behaviour. 
The word 'value' in the phrase 'Value Intonomy' reflects the 
fact that to be a person is, in part at least, to be a 
valuing being. As implied above, the primary intent here is 
1 For the distinction between persons and humans see Tooley, Michael. 
Abortion and Infanticide. (Clarendon Press, U.K. 1985) Chapter Four, pp. 
51-58 
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moral, reflecting the fact that one of the unique things 
which human persons do is morally value acts as good or evil, 
right or wrong. Human beings, however, also psychologically 
value themselves and their lives as significant or worthless. 
They aesthetically value objects as beautiful or ugly, and 
epistemologically value event and states of affairs as 
meaningful or meaningless. 
Thus the word value denotes the universal assumption of value 
agency in the behaviour of human beings - an assumption which 
entails morality, psychological value (that people matter, 
that they are significant beings), aesthetics and 
epistemology. Thus if a being thinks in terms of right and 
wrong, beauty and ugliness, significance and meaninglessness; 
if it believes, and acts as if, it had real choices; if its 
deliberations about what it perceives as its choices involve 
normative, aesthetic or epistemic considerations, and if it 
can experience guilt, then that being is a person in terms of 
this theory. 
That human beings do think and act this way, and that 
thinking and acting this way is at least one of the things 
that makes them persons, is a simple and incontrovertible 
fact of the human experience. We are all rule-makers; we are 
valuers of things, including our selves. And all morality, 
all art, all rule making, all moral or values talk 
whatsoever, assumes Value Intonomy. For example, even just to 
try and motivate someone's behaviour, by appealing to the 
concept of what is in their own interests, is to presuppose 
that they have the capability to recognize and act 
normatively on the concept of interest (ie: that they have 
the moral element of Value Intonomy) Of course other 
creatures on the planet can be said to have interests, 
welfare, and so on, but they do not conceptualize them as 
such. Wasps, for example, are not motivated to build colonies 
and feed their young because they recognize that so doing is 
in their interests. 
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They simply, and mindlessly, build colonies and feed their 
young2 • Thus, although we can, and do, incorporate the 
interests of non-persons into our moral deliberations, 
consideration of interests (which is a part of our Value 
Intonomy) is exclusively an activity of persons. 
So to is the evident need, on the part of human persons, to 
feel at least potentially significant; to believe that our 
lives have, or should have, meaning and value. Value 
Intonomy, the same feature of being persons that motivates us 
to value certain acts as good or evil, similarly motivates us 
to value our lives and the state of being persons. And it 
really does not matter on what grounds someone may approve, 
disapprove, justify or prohibit anything, the very activity 
of evaluating or justifying, the possibility of behaving as 
a moral, and thereby significant, agent, is fundamental 3 • The 
absence of such a capacity denies the very possibility of 
Value Intonomy and, with it, the capability to function as a 
human person. 
Furthermore, the tenability, or integrity, of believing that 
we are the kinds of beings who have a realisable potential 
for value and meaning, is evidently essential to our survival 
and well-being as human persons. To survive, and live well, 
we need to be able to believe that we matter, that our lives 
have value. The tenability of that belief, and the sense of 
personal significance based upon it, is violated whenever our 
Value Intonomy is violated. That is what violence does, and 
that is why violence is a problem. 
In the phrase 'Value Intonomy' the word 'value' denotes a 
kind of functioning whereas the coined word 'intonomy' 
denotes a quality of that functioning. 
2 Cf: Dennett, Daniel. ELBOW ROOM: The Varieties of Free Will Worth 
Wanting Clarendon, Oxford, 1984. esp Pg 11 
3 Cf: Waldron, Jeremy. Theories of Rights (OUP, 1984) pg 20 
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Specifically, the word 'intonomy' denotes the sufficiency of 
a kind of wholeness; the uncoerced cohesion of related parts 
into a single, morally 'healthy', locus (which is the person 
her or himself, seen as a morally autonomous unit). 
The word 'Intonomy' is devised from the fusion of 
'integrity' and 'autonomy' in order to reflect an important 
hypothesis about what it is to be a person. 
The word 'integrity', as used here, needs to be 
understood more as a cognate of 'integral' than of 'good'. 
And, as is the case with physical integrity (ie:health) it is 
a quality of being usually most evident in proportion to its 
lack. Normally, say, when we talk of someone as having 
integrity, we intend that they be understood as a thoroughly 
decent person, someone who is morally upright, honest and 
trustworthy. This sense of integrity, as a synonym of 'Good', 
is close to that intended in the phrase 'Value Intonomy' and, 
in normal circumstances, one flows from the other. In the 
sense in which I intend the word, however, someone like, for 
example, a slave simply cannot have the integrity element of 
Value Intonomy (that capability is given over to the hands of 
the slave owner), even if they, in themselves, are a 
thoroughly decent person. The kind of integrity, intended by 
phrases such as 'moral integrity' is essentially focused on 
the self as a morally autonomous being. As will be argued 
below4 , however: 
a) persons are significantly social constructs, and 
b) societies themselves may lack moral integrity. 
Because of the first fact (a) persons cannot truly be said to 
be fully autonomous beings in the sense of being morally 
self-sufficient or unconnected to society. Nevertheless, 
because of the second fact (b), a degree of moral autonomy 
needs to be defined and protected if the integrity of persons 
is to survive in a morally violent society. It is to morally 
distinguish personal integrity, from the social integrity of 
4 See Chapter Two 'The Integral Paradigm' 
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which persons are necessarily a part, that the word 
'intonomy' is coined. 'Intonomy' may therefore be read as 
referring to the integrity and autonomy of a valuing being, 
given that such beings exist within the interdependence of a 
society (which itself may have varying degrees of integrity. 
INTONOMY 
Intonomy comprises three main elements (two primary and one 
secondary) and operates on two levels. The two primary 
elements of Value Intonomy are moral freedom and moral power. 
Believing ourselves to be moral agents, we only have Value 
Intonomy when we can also believe that we have the freedom 
and power to function as moral agents, especially in the 
definition and influence of our own destinies. 
Moral freedom, as used here, is to be understood not as 
a freedom from necessity, nor is it the privilege of 
arbitrary choice. It is, rather, the freedom, within such 
natural constraints as we may all have to endure, to order 
our own values, to make our own moral choices, set our own 
goals and take responsibility for them. Such freedom is 
synonymous with being a moral adult and, on the evidence of 
Psychology, is a necessary condition of mental health5 • 
Moral power, similarly, is both the ability to exercise 
the results of our own moral freedom and the capacity to 
preserve our own integrity against the misuse of power by 
other people. Thus it is, at base, the power to survive; the 
power to assert ourselves, especially in the face of 
competition from nature and other people, in the belief that 
our survival, our value, matters. Essentially the distinction 
between moral freedom and moral power is that between private 
and public valences of value. Moral freedom is the power to 
be ourselves within the social context, moral power is the 
freedom to interact with society on terms which preserve and 
enhance our own moral integrity. 
5 Cf: Fromm, Erich Man for Himself (Routledge & Kegan Paul, U.K. 1975). 
See especially pp. viii, 7, 151. 
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Issuing from Moral freedom and power is a third, and 
secondary element, of moral responsibility, whereby we can be 
held accountable for the consequences of our choices and 
actions. We can only have moral responsibility to the extent 
that we exercise our moral freedom and power. Thus anyone 
with Value Intonomy can rationally be held morally 
responsible, and the denial of this responsibility (as, for 
example, under Paternalism) is itself felt as a form of 
violence, even though the responsibility itself is not 
primary - being conditional on moral power and freedom. 
To illustrate the autonomy aspect of Value Intonomy take, for 
example, the situation in which a person has a choice between 
two values (say, a career option and some outside interest 
such as a sport). They choose to sacrifice one value for an 
uncertain possibility of realising the other. If this choice 
is a function of their own values system (ie: if it is they 
who value one state above the other), if their choice has not 
been defrauded by deceit, and if the only constraints they 
face, in pursuit of this goal, are the normal and natural 
ones of ability and circumstance, then, in that regard at 
least, they still have Value Intonomy as the phrase is used 
in the Value Intonomy Theory of Violence. This is so even if, 
under the terms of various ethical theories, their choices 
can be categorised as mistaken or morally wrong. On the other 
hand, a slave, or someone who is, say, economically 
oppressed, lacks Value Intonomy to the extent to which they 
are made not free to order their own values and do not have 
the power to attempt the realisation of those values within 
their lives or societies. 
The two levels on which the integrity aspect of intonomy 
operates are: within itself and as part of the overall 
personality. 
1) Within itself our morality has integrity when its 
conceptual elements are internally consistent with each 
other, and when they are assented to, rather than being 
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violently coerced. The conceptual elements, referred to here, 
are those of the axiology (the ordering of values) and the 
deontic (the norms that guide behaviour). A person may, for 
example, have a deontic that is foolish or counter-productive 
in terms of their own axiology. Similarly the axiology itself 
may be distorted through coerced, self-destructive or 
contradictory elements. Such a morality lacks integrity in 
terms of the Value Intonomy Theory. 
2) The second level of integrity is a function of the 
fact that assumptions of moral agency are part of what it is 
to be persons. If these assumptions are absent, then we are 
not fully persons. If they are present, but in a way that 
distorts or truncates the personality, then we are damaged 
persons. 
Thus our morality is integral with our personhood when it 
augments, rather than erodes, our personal welfare, our 
potential as human beings, and the ability to function 
constructively as members of human society. A sick or violent 
morality, for example, damages our sense of self and self-
worth, it diminishes or perverts our abilities. Such a 
morality lacks integrity in a way similar to the way, say, a 
diseased liver lacks physical integrity both within itself 
and as part of the body from which it derives, and to which 
it contributes, being. In this sense 'integrity' has a close 
affinity with what existentialist philosophers and 
psychologists refer to as 'authenticity' 6 • An authentic 
personality being, in part at least, one which has a moral 
element which both makes sense and is a strength to it. 
To SUMMARISE: Whether or not people are, in fact, moral 
agents, and whether or not that moral agency, if it exists, 
6 For philosophical 'authenticity' refer to Olafson, Frederick. 
'Authenticity and Obligation' in Principles and Persons. An Ethical 
Interpretation of Existentialism (Johns Hopkins, U.S. 1967). Extracts re-
printed in Taylor, Paul. Problems of Moral Philosophy (3rd ed) 
(Wadsworth, U.S. 1978). pp. 681-690 (cf: p. 623). See also Bambrough, 
Renford. Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
U.K. 1979) pp. 77 & 82. 
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does give their lives value and significance, is entirely a 
moot point. Universally, however, people do think and act as 
if that was the case - and that syndrome of belief and 
behaviour (which I call Value Intonomy) is enough for us to 
perceive certain situations as violent and to perceive 
violence as a problem. Furthermore, the integrity of that 
syndrome is essential to the well-being of human persons - we 
do need to 'believe in ourselves' in order to live well (and 
that essential self-affirmation is itself a function of Value 
Intonomy). It is the tenability of that syndrome, and the 
sense of self which it incorporates, that is violated by 
those misuses of human power which we call 'violent'. 
VIOLENCE AS THE VIOLATION OF VALUE INTONOMY 
The crux of the Value Intonomy Theory of Violence is that 
Value Intonomy exists, as defined and as a fact of the human 
condition. It is not a normative or hypothetical construct 
demanding metaphysically dubious premises. Rather, it is an 
empirically verifiable, quantifiable and essential fact of 
human experience. Because this is so, because Value Intonomy 
exists and has the function that it does, the damage or 
denial of a human being's Value Intonomy damages or denies 
their opportunity to participate fully in personhood. This is 
what violence does. And it is this damage, to our personhood, 
that is the central harm and problem of violence. Therefore, 
talk of violence, as violating Value Intonomy, entails that 
violence violates the fact and sense of our being persons 
(ie: valuing and potentially significant beings) . It violates 
our moral freedom, our moral power, and thereby violates what 
it is to be a person. 
Not all forceful acts do this, and not all the acts that do 
achieve this are forceful, but I do believe that, if we 
explore the enduring human perceptions about what is violent, 
we will find the violation of what I have called 'Value 
Intonomy' to be a common element in those perceptions. 
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THE FACTUAL DEFINITION OF VIOLENCE 
In consequence of what has been said above, violence is 
defined as the violation of Value Intonomy with the intent or 
effect of harm. Any behaviour which meets this criterion is 
violent in terms of this theory, whether or not it involves 
f/, h/ or m/violence. (For example, if an violent harm is 
morally justified it ceases to be m/violent [wrong]. Under 
this theory it remains factually violent nonetheless). 
In this definition of violence 'Value Intonomy' 
identifies what is violated and 'harm' identifies the kind of 
violation. Both words are used solely in the descriptive 
sense. 
The primary import of 'harm', as used here, is that of damage 
to the interests, welfare or moral/psychological integration 
of the person whose Value Intonomy is being violated, and it 
is the factor which distinguishes violence from non-violent 
trespass or mere hurt. It is obvious, for example, that a 
good dentist can hurt a patient without harming them, and a 
bad dentist can harm a patient without hurting them - indeed, 
in dentistry, the only way not to harm a patient may be to 
hurt them. Thus violent harm may include hurt but, where it 
does, it is hurt plus something else. That 'something else' 
is primarily an erosion of the object person's welfare and 
personhood by the diminution of their Value Intonomy. 
The fact of harm is qualified with the phrase 'intent or 
effect' because it is not necessary for violence to be 
successful in order for it to be violent. Nor does the 
success of violence render it less violent. Certain victims 
of institutionalised violence ( such as slavery, sexism or 
internment) have maintained their Value Intonomy in spite of 
the violence done against them. Some, on the other hand, have 
accepted the denial of their moral power and freedom -
finding pleasure or value in the escape from responsibility 
that such states can bring. In the first case violence fails 
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to achieve the intended end, in the second case, the success 
of violence is embraced as a good by the victim. In both 
cases, however, the mere intent to deny people their moral 
power and freedom is enough to render the acts violent, in 
terms of the Value Intonomy Theory, quite independently of 
the effects which follow. 
This is not to say that all human acts of force or harm, 
which fall outside this definition, are not violent or are 
not problems. Allied acts (such as, for example, cruelty 
against animals) are, however, derivative of this problem. 
Thus the violation of Value Intonomy, either by committing or 
enduring violence, is the crux, not the limit, of the 
problem. 
This, moreover, is simply what the core problem of violence 
is, regardless of any particular ethical considerations. 
Violating Value Intonomy may, or may not, make violence 
wrong. That is a judgement that depends on normative theory. 
However, independently of ethical judgements, violating Value 
Intonomy is what makes certain acts violent - and being 
violent, in this sense, is what makes those acts a problem 
for persons (ie: beings with Value Intonomy). 
I started this chapter by pointing out that, underlying one 
of our common uses of the term 'violence' is the intuition of 
something being violated. That 'something' is our Value 
Intonomy - the integration of value-assuming beliefs and 
behaviours, in our personality, which makes us the kind of 
beings who experience existence within an evaluative 
framework (both outside of ourselves, in the sense of 
postulating certain acts to be good or evil, and within 
ourselves, in the sense of understanding ourselves to be 
worthwhile beings). This is a real thing, a fact, and it 
matters to human survival. Violence simply is the violation 
of that syndrome. 
